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In the light of recent studies into the impact of cognitive load on detecting deception, the impact of cog-
nitive load on faking on the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale (GSS) was investigated. Eighty undergradu-
ate students participated in the study, and were randomly assigned to one of four conditions resulting
from a combination of the factors: instruction type (genuine or instructed faking, see Hansen, Smeets,
& Jelicic, 2009) and concurrent task (yes or no). Findings show that instructed fakers, not performing a
concurrent task, score signiﬁcantly higher on yield 1 in comparison to genuine interviewees. This is in-
line with previous studies into faking on the GSS. However, instructed fakers, performing a concurrent
task, achieved signiﬁcantly lower yield 1 scores than instructed fakers not performing a concurrent task.
Genuine (non fakers) showed a different response to increased cognitive load during the dual-task par-
adigm. This study suggests that increasing cognitive load may potentially indicate (and preclude) faking
attempts on the yield dimension of the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale.
 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The aim of this study is to investigate to what extent increasing
cognitive load during the GSS procedure may affect interrogative
suggestibility and, especially, attempts at faking interrogative sug-
gestibility. Interrogative suggestibility can be a serious psycholog-
ical vulnerability during police questioning and is measured using
the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale (GSS), which is widely used
within the academic and applied forensic settings (Gudjonsson,
1984; Gudjonsson, 1987; Gudjonsson, 2003; Gudjonsson, 2010).
Included [in this scale] are three measures of interrogative suggest-
ibility: (i) yield 1 scores measure misinformation acceptance as a
result of the pressure associated with questioning; (ii) yield 2
scores measure misinformation acceptance in the face of explicit
critical feedback; and (iii) Shift scores measure the extent to which
interviewees change their initial answers in response to critical
feedback; this measures how sensitive interviewees are to pressure
from the interviewer (also an indicator of suggestibility as well as a
tendency to accept misleading information).
Several studies into faking on the GSS have highlighted features
that may distinguish fakers from those who are genuinely suggest-
ible (e.g. Baxter & Bain, 2002; Boon, Gozna, & Hall, 2008; Woolston,ll rights reserved.
est London, Paragon House,
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et al. The effect of cognitive lo
3), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pBain, & Baxter, 2006). One of which is that those who fake tend to
achieve high scores on the yield 1 subscale of the GSS in compari-
son to their shift scores. Those who attempt to fake on the GSS
seem not to realise that changing/shifting answers in response to
feedback, which is critical of their initial answer(s) may also be a
sign of interrogative suggestibility (Baxter & Bain, 2002). This ten-
dency though towards high yield scores within the faking condi-
tion might also be attributed to natural vulnerability within
interviewees due to suggestibility or acquiescent responding (see
the study by Pollock, 1996 on this issue). This means that high
yield 1 scores in conjunction with relative low shift scores may
not be a valid marker of faking, leading to a risk of false positives
when classifying malingering if such a marker is used as a sign of
faking. It appears that more research is needed to identify further
signs of faking on the GSS.1.1. Cognitive load
Cognitive Load Theory (CLT) proposes that working memory can
only hold a limited amount of information and/or perform a lim-
ited number of tasks simultaneously. When undertaking tasks,
the quantity of information and interactions that must be pro-
cessed can lead to either [cognitive] overloading or under-loading
of the ﬁnite level of working memory resources available. Every as-
pect of the task must be processed for complete learning to take
place (Paas, Renkel, & Sweller, 2004).ad on faking interrogative suggestibility on the Gudjonsson Suggestibility
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amount of time, the more taxing it is on working memory, taking
longer to process and learn the information (Sweller, 1988). Split-
ting attention, between two tasks, is an example of how cognitive
burden can be imposed upon working memory (Chandler & Swel-
ler, 1992; Ginns, 2006). If the cognitive load associated with a pro-
cedure is low, due to simple content or performing a single task,
sufﬁcient working memory resources remain allowing the individ-
ual to fully take-in and understand the task and/or instructions.
When cognitive load is high, as a result of either difﬁcult context
or split-attention, due to performing dual tasks simultaneously,
then the total cognitive load of that task may exceed the working
memory resources available, resulting in failures in learning and
comprehension (Ginns, 2006).
Research within the area of memory and interrogative suggest-
ibility has demonstrated the importance of cognitive factors and
efﬁciency in recollection performance as well as susceptibility/
resilience to both misinformation and pressures during the GSS
interview – and thus interrogative suggestibility (e.g. Merckelbach,
Muris, Rassin, & Horselenberg, 2000; Vredeveldt, Hitch, &
Baddeley, 2011). It may well be that, as cognitive load increases
(due to split-attention) working memory resources are exceeded,
which precludes individuals’ ability to effectively critically evalu-
ate the information in the GSS questions in light of the story that
was read to them (at the start of the GSS procedure). Uncertainty
regarding the required/correct answers becomes heightened and
any negative feedback more effective, resulting in increased inter-
rogative suggestibility in terms of the acceptance of misleading
information (yield) and answer-changes in response to negative
feedback (shift) (Gudjonsson & Clark, 1986).
1.2. Cognitive load and faking interrogative suggestibility
There are several possible reasons why being asked to fake on
the GSS may seem, at ﬁrst, to be cognitively demanding in compar-
ison to performing the standard GSS interview: (i) instructed fakers
may be more conscious that they are trying to fake (appear sug-
gestible), and may therefore monitor their answers more carefully
as well as monitor the interviewer’s responses and behaviour more
carefully (DePaulo & Kirkendol, 1989), and (ii) instructed fakers are
often asked to role-play (e.g. lawyers may instruct clients to fake
suggestibility, see Hansen et al., 2009) and they may become pre-
occupied by their instructed task (DePaulo et al., 2003). However,
in studies into faking on the GSS, immediately prior to commenc-
ing the role-playing task, instructed-fakers are provided with infor-
mation about what they need to do (‘‘to trick the interviewer into
believing that you are susceptible to accepting leading questions’’).
This equips them with knowledge that questions will be sugges-
tive, and that they are to accept them; critical evaluation is thus
no longer necessary, reducing any uncertainty, and rendering the
cognitive load associated with the instructed-faker condition rela-
tively low. Successful faking under these conditions, demonstrated
through relatively high yield 1 scores, will be enabled.
When cognitive load is increased, through requiring instructed
fakers to engage in a concurrent task during GSS interview (like
in the present study, where a concurrent digit-span task – to split
attention – is undertaken by a proportion of participants; Robbins
et al., 1996; Vrij, Fisher, Mann, & Leal, 2008a; Vrij et al., 2008b), in-
structed fakers may become distracted, making the primary objec-
tive of faking on the GSS more difﬁcult to achieve (Chandler &
Sweller, 1992; Ginns, 2006). The cognitive load associated with
performing a dual-task paradigm may be relatively high, resulting
in failures in comprehension, and a lesser ability to focus on both
the information within the GSS questions (to detect which are
the suggestive questions) and the task of faking. Instructed-fakers,
when performing a concurrent working memory task, may be lessPlease cite this article in press as: Drake, K. E., et al. The effect of cognitive lo
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parison to instructed-fakers without a concurrent task who typi-
cally score relatively high on the yield 1 dimension of the GSS
(e.g. Baxter & Bain, 2002; Boon et al., 2008; Woolston et al.,
2006), instructed-fakers with a concurrent working memory task
will score signiﬁcantly lower on yield 1.
Research within the area of detecting deception has already
shown that increasing cognitive load during an interview (i.e. by
asking participants to recall an event in reverse order or adopting
a dual-task methodology; Robbins et al., 1996) can, to an extent,
aid the facilitation of lie detection (see Granhag & Strömwall,
2002; Vrij et al., 2008a; Vrij et al., 2008b). Splitting attention
may also reduce faking ability on the GSS.
Therefore, and in light of cognitive load theory also, it is pro-
posed that cognitive load may render faking on the GSS more dif-
ﬁcult to achieve, indicated through signiﬁcantly lower yield 1
scores in comparison to those obtained by instructed fakers who
are just required to fake (and not to perform a concurrent task).
This is in contrast to how cognitive load is predicted to affect inter-
viewees, naïve to the entails of the GSS; such participants may be
rendered more suggestible on both the yield and shift dimensions
of the GSS when cognitive load is increased, owing to elevated lev-
els of uncertainty (Gudjonsson & Clark, 1986).
The following predictions are offered:
(1) In line with previous studies into faking on the GSS,
instructed fakers in comparison to naïve participants will
score signiﬁcantly higher on the ﬁrst round of misleading
questions (yield 1 score) but will not differ signiﬁcantly in
term of shift scores.
(2) Instructed fakers, when performing a concurrent task, will
score signiﬁcantly lower on the yield 1 subscale in compar-
ison to instructed fakers without a concurrent task.
(3) Naïve interviewees (i.e. those who are not instructed to fake
and are naïve to what the GSS entails), performing a concur-
rent task, will conversely score signiﬁcantly higher on the
yield 1 and shift dimensions
(4) Working memory ability is a proposed covariate in this
study.
2. Method
2.1. Participants
The sample consisted of 80 participants, 45 females and 35
males (mean age = 19.35 years, standard deviation = 1.41,
range = 18–26). Participants were an opportunity sample, recruited
through the experimental participation scheme and by email with-
in the School of Psychology.2.2. Materials
2.2.1. Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale 1 (GSS1; Gudjonsson, 1984;
Gudjonsson, 1997)
The GSS memory recall task consists of a narrative and a set of
questions. The narrative is made up of 40 conceptual units occur-
ring in a speciﬁc order in the form of a story. Each instance is
scored as ‘successfully recalled’ if the interviewee is able to freely
recall that instance. The words used (by the interviewee) to recall
the instances need not be exactly as written in the narrative. The
maximum free-recall score that can be achieved is 40, which would
indicate that the interviewee has correctly recounted everything
that occurred in the story. Furthermore, a set of 20 questions con-
sisting of 15 misleading and 5 ‘true’ ﬁller questions is used in the
questioning phase (see Procedure section below).ad on faking interrogative suggestibility on the Gudjonsson Suggestibility
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Participants were presented with a series of ﬁve numbers taken
from the Wechsler Memory Scale (1989). Five numbers were cho-
sen as a result of conducting an initial pilot phase. During this
phase, interviewee-self-reports suggested that asking interviewees
to remember ﬁve numbers (whilst being interviewed on the GSS)
was sufﬁcient to allow investigation into the effect of cognitive
load on instructed-malingering ability, without the danger of par-
ticipants becoming over-burdened and disengaging.
2.3. Procedure
Following standard GSS procedure, the GSS narrative was read
aloud by the interviewer and immediately afterwards, participants
were asked to freely recall everything they could remember of the
narrative (immediate free recall phase). In the traditional form of
the GSS, the immediate free recall phase is followed by ﬁller tasks,
a delayed free recall phase and the questioning (or interview)
phase. In the present study the delayed free recall phase was omit-
ted for several reasons: (i) in the current study there was no ﬁller,
providing an inadequate time interval between immediate recall
and the conventional delayed recall phase (Gudjonsson, 1997)
and (ii) more recent studies have shown the delayed free recall
phase is an unnecessary part of the procedure (see Smeets, Lep-
pink, Jelicic, & Merckelbach, 2009), with little impact upon overall
performance and suggestibility scores. Minimising participant fati-
gue, by reducing the length of the procedure, was an additional
motivating factor in the decision to exclude the delayed free recall
phase from the GSS procedure.
During the interview phase, 20 questions (of which 15 were
misleading) were administered immediately after the free recall
phase. Participants’ responses were scored to provide the yield 1
score (the answers to the ﬁve ‘true questions’ do not contribute
to this score). Immediately following the ﬁrst question phase, neg-
ative feedback was given by the interviewer, using standard GSS
instructions; the interviewee was told ‘‘You have made a number
of errors, and it is therefore necessary to go through all of the ques-
tions once more and this time try to be more accurate’’. All 20
questions were then repeated, to measure the extent to which
interviewees shift their initial (20) answers. A yield 2 score was
calculated based on the number of the 15 misleading questions
yielded to post-negative feedback. The four experiment groups fol-
lowed identical procedures up until the interview phase, where
different instructions were given depending on the condition that
participants were assigned to.
For interviewees allocated to either the instructed-faking  no
concurrent task condition, or the instructed-faking  concurrent
task condition, the instructions to fake followed those provided by
Hansen et al. (2009), and were delivered to each interviewee be-
fore the GSS question phase began. Interviewees were told: ‘‘You
are going to be interviewed regarding the content of a story that
you have just read. You should attempt to play the role of someone
who is a suspect in a criminal investigation. You have the chance of
getting off the hook if you can convince the interviewer that you
are easily inﬂuenced. You should try to trick the interviewer into
believing that you are susceptible to accepting leading questions,
that is, questions that may assume or imply information that is
not completely true or is misleading. You will also be given a cou-
ple of statements with which you can either agree or not agree.
Again your chances to get off the hook rise, if you respond in a cer-
tain way. ‘‘Let the interviewer believe that you are eager to please
other people and you try to avoid conﬂicts with others’’.
The instructions for the ‘genuine’ condition when there was a
concurrent task were as follows: ‘‘You are now going to be inter-
viewed on the content of the story that you have just been read.
I am also going to present you with a series of numbers (see digitPlease cite this article in press as: Drake, K. E., et al. The effect of cognitive lo
Scale. Personality and Individual Differences (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pspan task). Please try to remember these numbers as best as you
can. At the end of the interview, I will ask you to recall those num-
bers.’’ Participants were shown the numbers until the questions
began. This was to increase the probability that participants were
listening to the instructions given and were not instead preoccu-
pied by the digit span task. The standard negative feedback phrase
then followed.
For interviewees experiencing a concurrent task (i.e. those in
the instructed-faking  concurrent task or those in the genu-
ine  concurrent task conditions), the items of the Digit Span test
were presented following the interview instructions (see above
paragraphs) and before both sets of interview questions. Before
the 20 questions were repeated, interviewees were given another
series of digits to remember (whilst answering the 20 questions).
This digit span task required participants to recall the ﬁve numbers
immediately after answering each set of 20 questions.
2.4. Data analysis
The appropriateness of the working memory variables (the
number of digits recalled correctly; NDRC, and the number of digits
recalled in the correct order; NDCO; Wechsler, 1989) as covariates
was ascertained ﬁrst of all, to determine whether to use a multivar-
iate analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) or a multivariate analysis of
variance (ANOVA). Covariates are only appropriate if there is sub-
stantial correlation with the dependent variables (DV) (in this case,
yield 1, yield 2, shift and total suggestibility scores) but not with
any other covariate (Pallant, 2007; Stevens, 1996). The following
process was used: The distribution of the proposed covariates
and DVs were checked, revealing a ﬂat distribution of the proposed
covariates (k = 2.01; NDRC and k = 1.78; NDCO). Spearman cor-
relation tests were thus used to check the relationships between
the proposed covariates and the dependent variables. This showed
a very strong relationship (r = .933, p < .001) between the NDRC
and the NDCO. However, neither the NDRC nor NDCO correlated
signiﬁcantly with any of the DVs.
In light of the above results, a multivariate ANOVA – not an
ANCOVA – was used to test the hypotheses, as NDRC and/or NDCO
are not appropriate covariates (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). The
independent variables are: (i) instructed-faking or no instructed-
faking and (ii) concurrent task or no concurrent task. The dependent
variables are the yield 1, yield 2, shift and total suggestibility scores.
Levene’s test showed signiﬁcant results for yield 1, yield 2 and
shift, so it was decided to adopt a more stringent signiﬁcance level
(.01) for evaluating results involving these DVs. Total suggestibility
though was not signiﬁcant therefore the .05 signiﬁcance level was
used in this case.3. Results
3.1. Descriptive statistics and hypothesis testing
Table 1 presents the means and standard deviations for the ob-
served variables.
3.2. Yield 1
There was a signiﬁcant main effect of instruction type: F
(1, 76) = 31.0, p < .001, g92 = .060 and a signiﬁcant main effect of
concurrent task: F (1, 76) = 12.8, p = .001,g92 = .020. The interaction
between instruction type and concurrent task was also statistically
signiﬁcant: F (1, 76) = 26.4, p < 001, g92 = .051.
Planned comparisons revealed that for instructed-fakers, yield 1
scores were signiﬁcantly higher in the faking/no-concurrent task
condition than in the faking/with-concurrent task condition:ad on faking interrogative suggestibility on the Gudjonsson Suggestibility
aid.2012.12.011
Table 1
Means and (in brackets) standard deviations of yield 1, yield 2, Shift and total
suggestibility scores for concurrent task (with and without concurrent
task)  instruction type (genuine and instructed faking condition).
Concurrent task With Without
Instruction type Genuine Faking Genuine Faking
IR 15.6 (5.44) 16.6 (4.94) 16.1 (5.80) 17.5 (4.92)
Yield 1 4.40 (1.98) 4.65 (1.42) 3.50 (2.21) 9.70 (4.00)
Yield 2 5.65 (2.62) 6.10 (2.82) 4.30 (2.56) 8.20 (4.41)
Shift 3.25 (2.47) 5.65 (4.30) 2.95 (1.93) 3.80 (2.07)
Total suggest 7.65 (3.21) 10.3 (4.50) 6.45 (3.68) 13.5 (4.66)
Note: N = 20 per group. IR = immediate free recall; total suggest. = total
suggestibility.
4 K.E. Drake et al. / Personality and Individual Differences xxx (2013) xxx–xxxF (1, 38) = 28.3, p < .001, g92 = .096. Furthermore, yield 1 scores
were signiﬁcantly higher for participants in the faking/no
concurrent task condition than for participants in the genuine/no
concurrent task condition: F (1, 38) = 36.8, p < .001, g92 = .152. The
difference in yield 1 scores was not statistically signiﬁcant for par-
ticipants in the genuine/no concurrent task condition compared
with those in the genuine/with concurrent task condition:
F (1, 38) = 1.83, p = .184.
3.3. Yield 2, shift and total suggestibility
For yield 2 and total suggestibility scores, the main effect of
instruction type was statistically signiﬁcant: F (1, 76) = 9.27,
p = .003, g92 = .024 and F (1, 76) = 28.6, p < .001, g92 = .100 respec-
tively. Planned comparisons revealed that interviewees in the fak-
ing/no concurrent task condition scored signiﬁcantly higher than
those in the genuine/no concurrent task condition on yield 2 and
total suggestibility scores (p = .001, g92 = .024 and p < .001,
g92 = .052 respectively). The main effect of instruction type on shift
scores was not statistically signiﬁcant under the more stringent
signiﬁcance level: F (1, 76) = 6.49, p = .013, g92 = .027. The main ef-
fect of concurrent task on yield 2, shift and total suggestibility
scores was also not statistically signiﬁcant.
4. Discussion
The aim of this study is to investigate to what extent increasing
cognitive load during the GSS procedure may affect interrogative
suggestibility, especially attempts at faking interrogative suggest-
ibility. In line with cognitive load theory and research into detect-
ing deception that has already shown how increasing cognitive
load can facilitate the detection of deception (because deceptive
behaviour is more difﬁcult to achieve under increased cognitive
load), it was proposed that instructed fakers would score signiﬁ-
cantly lower on the yield 1 dimension of the GSS than interviewees
that are only required to attempt to fake on the GSS (and not to
also perform a concurrent task). Conversely increasing cognitive
load was deemed to signiﬁcantly heighten yield 1 and shift scores
in naïve participants (i.e. those who are not instructed to fake and
are unaware of the entails of the GSS).
Current ﬁndings, despite the slight difference in methodology,
appear in conjunction with previous research into faking on the
GSS (see Baxter & Bain, 2002; Boon et al., 2008; Woolston et al.,
2006), showing that instructed fakers scored signiﬁcantly higher
on the yield 1 subscale of the GSS in comparison to naïve partici-
pants. The fact that instructed fakers are given insights into what
to expect from the GSS procedure, enables such individuals to
overcome any uncertainty surrounding the correct answers
needed. Under the instructed-faking condition, participants may
be able to recognise which questions are the suggestive questions,
and the required answers needed. The intrinsic cognitive load asso-Please cite this article in press as: Drake, K. E., et al. The effect of cognitive lo
Scale. Personality and Individual Differences (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pciated with the instructed-faking experimental condition may be
relatively minimal, enabling effective comprehension and critical
evaluation of the information in the GSS questions in light of the
story (at the start of the GSS procedure). Uncertainty is therefore
reduced which, when interviewees are instructed to fake, leads
to the ability to fake suggestibility successfully indicated by rela-
tively high yield 1 scores in comparison to naïve participants
(Chandler & Sweller, 1992; Ginns, 2006; Gudjonsson & Clark,
1986; Paas et al., 2004; Sweller, 1988).
On exposure to added cognitive load, through being instructed
to also engage in a concurrent digit-span working memory task,
the amount of cognitive load increases signiﬁcantly, which taxes
working memory (Paas et al., 2004; Robbins et al., 1996); in-
structed fakers with the concurrent task scored signiﬁcantly lower
on the Yield 1 subscale compared with fakers without a concurrent
task. By instructing fakers to perform a concurrent task during
questioning, fakers’ attention is split, making the primary task/
objective of appearing suggestible on the GSS more difﬁcult to
achieve (DePaulo et al., 2003; Granhag & Strömwall, 2002; Vrij
et al., 2008a; Vrij et al., 2008b). The intrinsic level of cognitive load
associated with the instructed faking/concurrent task experimen-
tal condition is larger, exercising working memory capacity. The
concurrent task may impede interviewees’ ability to critically eval-
uate the incoming questions, increasing uncertainty, and preclud-
ing recognition of the required response(s), in order to appear
suggestible (Chandler & Sweller, 1992; Ginns, 2006; Gudjonsson
& Clark, 1986; Paas et al., 2004; Sweller, 1988). Faking on the yield
1 subscale of the GSS seems to be made more difﬁcult to achieve
under increased cognitive load, which is in line with results shown
within the detecting deception literature (Vrij et al., 2008a; Vrij
et al., 2008b).
The fact though that the yield 1 scores in the faking/concurrent
task condition are still higher than in the naïve/no concurrent task
condition suggests that a degree of faking may still have been pos-
sible; the cognitive load associated with the faking/concurrent task
condition may not have been high enough to exceed working
memory capacity, and preclude interviewees’ engaging in the fak-
ing task. One limitation though within this study is that there is no
way of knowing to what extent interviewees within the faking/
concurrent task condition remained engaged with the dual-task
paradigm throughout the GSS interview (despite the fact that the
interviewees were asked to, at the end of the GSS procedure, recall
the numbers they were asked to remember at the start of the inter-
view). This could be a reason why appearing suggestible was still
possible, to a degree, within this condition; at intervals throughout
the interview, interviewees could well have been disengaging
from the dual-task paradigm, focusing solely on the faking task
(Chandler & Sweller, 1992; Sweller, 1988).
As predicted also, naïve participants, when instructed to under-
take the concurrent task in conjunction to the GSS interview, did
achieve higher yield 1 and shift in comparison to naïve intervie-
wees not engaging in the concurrent task; though these increased
effects are not statistically signiﬁcant, as they have emerged to be
within the faking conditions. Naïve interviewees under added cog-
nitive load appear only marginally more suggestible on the yield 1
and shift dimensions, which was surprising. Perhaps naïve inter-
viewees coped with the situation, and their uncertainty, not by
yielding to the suggestive information but with alternative coping
mechanisms. Research has highlighted, after all, the role of coping
mechanisms in interrogative suggestibility (Gudjonsson, 1988;
Gudjonsson, 1995). Further research is needed to ascertain
whether this is the case.
Nevertheless, there still appears to be a difference in the way
that instructed fakers and naïve interviewees respond (on the
GSS) to the dual-task paradigm; this difference could well be an-
other indicator of instructed-faking on the GSS. More researchad on faking interrogative suggestibility on the Gudjonsson Suggestibility
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interrogative suggestibility (Pollock, 1996), varies type of cognitive
load (DeLeeuw & Mayer, 2008) to explore the effect of cognitive
load on interrogative suggestibility and faking interrogative sug-
gestibility, delving deeper into the mechanisms that may be in-
volved, and uses methods to ensure that interviewees within the
faking/concurrent task condition remain engaged with the dual-
task paradigm all the way through the GSS interview.References
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